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IR theory and the ‘Modern’ Middle Ages:  






The thesis that the secular system of modern international relations has medieval, religious roots 
is not new. Various accounts have documented how the Protestant Reformation and its late 
medieval antecedents represented a ‘revolution in ideas’ that broke away from the hierarchical 
arrangement of fragmented feudal polities, which was apparently characteristic of the Middle 
Ages, to the egalitarian society of sovereign states, which is seemingly synonymous with 
modernity.1 Linked to this is the standard story in IR that views the Renaissance, the 
Reformation and the Discovery of the New World as a radical rupture, which replaced the ‘Dark 
Ages’ with a new era of enlightenment progress.2 Such a supercessionist structuring of historical 
narrative reinforces the secularist bias that has dominated the discipline since the late 1950s and 
1960s. As a result of the secularism in IR theory, the role of religion in international affairs has 
not so much been neglected and overlooked as misrepresented and under-theorised.3 
 
Specifically for the purposes of this essay, IR theory lacks an account of both the historical 
influence and the contemporary relevance of rival theological approaches in relation to the 
modern international order. Recent scholarship in political thought and in the history of ideas has 
highlighted some of the profound continuities between the medieval and the modern period.4 
Building on these and other accounts, this essay explores the role of theological shifts and 
religious changes in the genesis of modern international relations. The focus is on the contrast 
between the Franciscan legacy and the Dominican heritage. 
 
My argument is that the modern Westphalian system of national states and transnational markets 
rests on late medieval ideas, notably Franciscan conceptions of inalienable individual rights, 
centrally vested sovereign power, and a natural state of anarchy that requires an artificial social                                                         
1 See, inter alia, J.L. Holzgrefe, ‘The Origins of Modern International Relations Theory’, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 15, no. 1 (January 1989), pp. 11-26; Daniel Philpott, ‘The Religious Roots of Modern International 
Relations’, World Politics, Vol. 52, no. 2 (January 2000), pp. 206-45. 
2 Hedley Bull, ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’, in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The 
Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 117-122; Robert Jackson, The Global 
Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
3 See Adrian Pabst, ‘The secularism of post-secularity: religion, realism and the revival of grand theory in IR’, 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (December 2012), pp. 995-1017, on which the present essay builds. 
4 See, for example, André de Muralt, L’unité de la philosophie politique. De Scot, Occam et Suarez au libéralisme 
contemporain (Paris: Vrin, 2002); Francis Oakley, Natural Law, Laws of Nature, Natural Rights: Continuity and 
Discontinuity in the History of Ideas (New York: Continuum, 2005). 
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contract. Insofar as these notions underpin the theories of thinkers such as Grotius, Hobbes, 
Locke or Kant who influenced the dominant modern accounts of states and markets, Franciscan 
theological theorisations shaped the secular outlook of modernity. Against the hegemony of 
modern secularism in IR that can paradoxically be traced to late medieval Franciscan theology, I 
contend that the Dominican tradition offers conceptual resources to chart an alternative 
modernity. 
 
To suggest that we live in the (late) modern age assumes already that we have assigned a 
particular meaning to modernity. But the modern project was never monolithic in the West or 
elsewhere. On the contrary, from a global historical perspective, there was no single modernity 
but rather multiple and even rival modernities that were variously more secular or more 
religious.5 Moreover, ‘we have never been modern’, as the French philosopher Bruno Latour has 
argued.6 For modernity rests on an irresolvable aporia between the notion of human artifice (the 
social contract) and unalterable nature (the violent state of nature). Crucially, there are no 
absolute breaks in history that inaugurate new eras which supersede preceding traditions and 
ideas, including the notion that Westphalia ushered in modern international affairs. If this is so, 
then perhaps it is also true that (late or post-)modernity is best described as the ‘modern’ Middle 
Ages – the intensification and extension of a certain late medieval ideas rather than a wholly new 
phase of history. In turn, this helps explain why the shape of contemporary international relations 
really is neo-medieval but in ways that have not been conceptualised by constructivist 
approaches or the English School. 
 
Section 1 briefly examines the historicist narrative in much of IR theory and traces it back to 
both Protestant and Catholic theology. Section 2 shows how the modern notion of secular 
imperium as an autonomous, neutral space on which the idea of the sovereign state rests was 
invented and instituted by late medieval Franciscan theology, in particular the work of John 
Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Section 3 argues that the conception of subjective, 
individual rights guaranteed by the sovereign state independently of the Church is similarly 
rooted in the nominalist theology of the Franciscans, which contrasts with the emphasis on 
objective ius, reciprocal rights and associative links between national states and the transnational 
Church in the realist theology of Dominicans such as Thomas Aquinas. Section 4 focuses on the 
Franciscan invention of modern markets that are based on sundering the immanent order of 
nature from the transcendent order of the supernatural Good in God and on separating gift from                                                         
5 See Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (ed.), Multiple Modernities (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002). 
6 Bruno Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes: essai d’anthropologie symétrique (Paris: La Découverte, 1991); 
trans. We Have Never Been Modern, tr. Catherine Porter (New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). 
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contract. The conclusion briefly suggests that the conceptual resources of the Dominican 
tradition can transform Franciscan modernity in the direction of a neo-medieval international 
order wherein human beings are seen as naturally ‘social animals’ (not self-proprietors of 
subjective rights) and both states and markets promote the pursuit of the common good. 
 
1. Beyond Westphalia: historicism and the theological sources of secular IR 
theory 
 
Much of academic research and public political debate oscillates between Westphalian and post-
Westphalian conceptions of international relations. The Westphalian account argues in favour of 
sovereign national states, equal inter-state relations and non-interference in domestic affairs, 
which the post-Westphalian approach views as either unfeasible or undesirable (or indeed both at 
once). However, both conceptions tend to regard Westphalia as the foundation of modern 
international relations, and neither questions the fundamentally historicist logic that governs the 
dominant versions of IR theory, i.e. the assumption that there are absolute breaks in history 
which inaugurate new eras.  
 
However, this kind of historicism is profoundly problematic for a number of reasons that matter 
to the nature of ‘modern’ international relations. First of all, it uncritically accepts the 
conventional periodisations of Antiquity, the Middle Ages and modernity, which ignore deep 
continuities over time – whether in relation to statehood, the law or social-cultural patterns of 
conflict and cooperation.7 Second, it embraces a supercessionist model of historical change, i.e. 
the assertion that older principles and practices are superseded by more sophisticated ones. 
Arguably, this conception underpins both Marxist and liberal narratives of progress that 
dominate both the humanities and the social sciences, including much of IR theory. The historian 
Brad Gregory puts this well: “Originally linked to strongly positive evaluations of historical 
progress in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this supercessionist structuring of large-scale 
narratives […] remains prevalent today”.8 Variants of progressivism are all part of the Whig 
interpretation of history that Herbert Butterfield rebutted in his eponymous book.9 By treating 
                                                        
7 On the continuity between Antiquity and the Middle Ages, see Julia M.H. Smith, Europe after Rome: A New 
Cultural History 500-1000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), esp. pp. 151-216, 253-92. On the continuity 
between the Middle Ages and modernity, see Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-
1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval 
and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Polity, 1997). 
8 Brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2013), p. 10. 
9 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London: George Bell, 1949). 
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the modern international order as an exemplification of historical evolution, supercessionism 
commits the fallacy of historicism that treats contingent events as necessary norms. 
 
Third, connected with this is the point that historicist supercessionism rests on an a-historical 
logic. The latter  was invented by late medieval secular reason and progressively instituted by the 
forces of Protestant confessionalisation and the Enlightenment.10 In positing absolute historical 
breaks – which in reality were entirely avoidable, contingent and arbitrary – this logic is unable 
to demonstrate its own presupposition that the passage from the Middle Ages to the modern era 
was somehow inevitable, necessary and normative.11 Fourth, this sort of historicism treats 
history as a fated and all-determining teleological process based on certain iron laws. Precisely 
for this reason, the genuine alternative is not to opt for a-historical, secular categories that are 
supposedly universal. Instead, it is to embrace history in such a way as to view intellectual, 
social and political developments in terms of their specific historical roots and their unfolding 
both over time and across space. For example, apparently universal ideas and structures, such as 
the global system of national states and transnational markets on which ‘modern’ international 
relations rest, can be traced genealogically to particular periods. These include the rise of 
nominalism in the fourteenth century, the Protestant Reformation starting in the late fifteenth 
century or the religious wars of the ‘long sixteenth century’ (ca. 1450-1650).12 Far from being 
isolated events or absolute breaks in history, their emergence formed part of an era spanning the 
early fourteenth to the late seventeenth century during which both ideas and practices already 
nascent during medieval times achieved fuller maturity and developed into the secular modern 
phase of the Middle Ages.13 
 
Fifth, one can extend the critique of Protestant-liberal historicism and suggest that approaches, 
which are centred on notions of long durée or cognate concepts, also lack historicity. The reason 
is that many late medieval features of the international system endured until the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and even intensified in scope. This includes the complex connections                                                         
10 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. Beyond secular reason, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006 [orig. pub. 
1990]); Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Louis Dupré, Passage to 
Modernity. An essay on the hermeneutics of nature and culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Michael 
Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
11 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), and Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003). 
12 Dupré, Passage to Modernity, pp. 15-90; Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity, pp. 19-43; Philpott, 
‘The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations’, 206-45; and Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, pp. 
129-179. 
13 Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 1150-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982); J.H. Burns, ‘Introduction’, in J.H. Burns (ed.), Cambridge History of Medieval Political 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 1-8; Oakley, Natural Law, Laws of Nature, Natural 
Rights, pp. 87-109. 
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between central state coercion and global market exploitation, notably the ‘possessive 
individualism’ of the social contract, agrarian surplus extraction and piratical forms of trade.14 
 
I shall return to the argument that modern states and markets were an intensification of certain 
late medieval developments rather than a new phase of history. For now, another argument needs 
to be made about liberal-Protestant historicism. The role of Protestantism and the ‘religious 
wars’ in bringing about the ‘modern’ Middle Ages (of which the late modern era is arguably a 
further extension) has to be complemented by an account of the Catholic roots of secularisation – 
from the late medieval Franciscan theology of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham via the 
Baroque scholasticism of Francisco Suárez all the way to contemporary Catholic liberalism.15  
 
First of all, John Duns Scotus’ invention of univocity was central to the origins of modern 
philosophy and politics because it paved the way for bracketing the transcendent foundation and 
finality of the world out of the picture. As many scholars have shown, Scotus’ ontology of 
univocity and representation replaced the metaphysics of analogy and participation on which the 
political theology of the Church Fathers and Doctors was founded.16 Far from being an obscure 
theological point, this shift in ideas constituted a veritable revolution that unfolded over several 
centuries. From late Antiquity to the high Middle Ages (to use standard periodisations), 
Christian theologians – often in conversation with Jewish or Islamic thinkers – fused Greco-
Roman philosophy with biblical revelation and emphasised the participation of all particular 
beings in the universal being of the personal Creator God.17  
 
By contrast, Scotist univocity implies that all things are “bare beings” rather than things in 
relations to other things and their shared source in being itself. From Descartes via Newton and 
Kant to Hegel, modern philosophy, ethics and science all rest on this ontology of univocally 
existing beings, which are stripped of all metaphysical positioning in relation to other beings and 
to common being (Aquinas’s Neo-Platonist ens commune). Crucially, Scotus’ ontology 
establishes the primacy of individual substance over relationality – a conceptual shift that laid                                                         
14 See Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict and London’s Overseas 
Traders 1550-1653 (London: Verso, 2003); Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648. Class, Geopolitics, and the Making 
of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003), esp. pp. 215-75. 
15 For some overarching accounts, see Taylor, A Secular Age, and Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity. 
16 See Eric Alliez, Les Temps Capitaux. Tome 1: Récits de la conquête du temps (Paris: Editions Cerf, 1991), pp. 
269-322; Dupré, Passage to Modernity, esp. chap. 1; Catherine Pickstock, After Writing. On the liturgical 
consummation of philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), esp. pp. 122-31; Olivier Boulnois, Être et représentation. 
Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l’époque de Duns Scot (XIIIe-XIVe siècle) (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1999). On the manner in which Scotist univocity of being led to the decline of a 
participatory metaphysics and the rise of a state-centric system, see Catherine Pickstock, ‘Numbers of Power, Lines 
of Transition: the decay of metaphysics and the loss of international order’, this volume. 
17 See Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), pp. 272-382. 
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the foundation for the dialectical oscillation between the one and the many, the individual and 
the collective as well as other binary opposites that characterise modern thinking, including in 
the field of IR. As Roland Bleiker argues, “IR theory and Western conceptualising in general 
have traditionally been based on the juxtaposition of antagonistic bipolar opposites”.18 
 
Second, the incipient dualism inaugurated by Scotus’ univocity of being was reinforced by the 
voluntarist and nominalist theology of William of Ockham. Based on the Scotist destruction of 
analogy and participation, Ockham makes the twin claim that will is the ultimate principle of 
reality (voluntarism) and that universals are merely mental concepts or names (nominalism). 
Ockham’s ontology reinforced Scotus’ by insisting on the priority of the individual over the 
universal and positing a radical separation of immanence from transcendence – a dualism that 
foreshadowed the transcendental philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes and Kant. Moreover, this 
separation grounded state supremacy vis-à-vis the Church and all other institutions within the 
temporal-spatial realm of the saeculum – i.e. in creedal Christianity, the time between the Fall 
and the eschaton.19 After Scotus and Ockham, the saeculum was not only redefined as an 
autonomous space separate from both God and the Church but also subsumed under the 
dominance of the imperium. 
 
Third, the invention and institution of an autonomous secular space, which progressively came 
under the exclusive purview of the state, was bound up with the sundering of nature from the 
supernatural. This dualism grounded all the modern dualisms – such as reason vs. faith, nature 
vs. grace or immanence vs. transcendence – that lead to the separation of theology from 
philosophy, physics, ethics, politics, and economics.20 As Charles Taylor remarks in his seminal 
book A Secular Age, “[o]ne of the great inventions of the West was that of an immanent order in 
Nature, whose working could be systematically understood and explained on its own terms”.21 
Over time, the idea of an autonomous immanent order bracketed God and transcendent shared 
ends out of the picture and reduced theological ethics to secular politics – preserving the unity of 
the state divided by inherently conflictual individual interests. 
 
Fourth, divorcing nature from the supernatural not only shaped the Reformation’s five solae – 
sola scriptura (by Scripture alone) sola fide (by faith alone) sola gratia (by grace alone), solo                                                         
18 Roland Bleiker, ‘East-West Stories of War and Peace: Neorealist Claims in Light of Ancient Chinese 
Philosophy’, in Stephen Chan, Peter Mandaville and Roland Bleiker (eds.), The Zen of International Relations 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 177-201 (quote at p. 181). 
19 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. 
20 Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), esp. pp. 25-63. 
21 Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 15. 
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Christo (through Christ alone) and soli Deo Gloria (glory to God alone) – which are all founded 
upon an unbridgeable gulf between creation and Creator. The nature-supernatural divide also 
informed the Counter-Reformation and the Baroque scholasticism of influential Catholic 
theologians such as Francisco Suàrez, whose theology accentuates the autonomy of “pure 
nature” and thereby divorces man’s natural end from his supernatural finality. This conception 
relegates divine grace to an extrinsic principle that is superadded to the natural realm, rather than 
a supernaturally infused gift that deifies nature from within (as it was for the Church Fathers and 
Doctors in both the Greek East and the Latin West). As a result, human activity in the polity, the 
economy and society is separated from divine deification, which implies that both state and 
market are seen as increasingly autonomous and amoral. 
 
Thus, the modern invention of pure immanent nature – on which the secular settlement of 
national states and transnational markets is based – goes back both Protestant and Catholic 
theology. As Hegel wrote in a famous paragraph from The Philosophy of Right, the origin of the 
modern state as “a self-organising rational and ethical organisation” can be attributed to the 
breakdown of religious unity in the West.22 For reason was sundered from faith and ethics from 
the supernatural Good in God. These two ideas and cognate concepts originated in the 
Franciscan tradition and gradually displaced the more reciprocalist and mutualist vision of the 
Dominicans (in particular the work of St. Thomas Aquinas), as the remainder of the essay will 
seek to show. 
 
2. Franciscan theology and the invention of the secular imperium 
 
The modern state system rests on a number of foundational concepts and theories, notably the 
idea of inalienable individual rights, centrally vested sovereign power, and a natural state of 
anarchy that requires an artificial social contract both within and across sovereign nations. These 
concepts and theories can be traced genealogically to late medieval Franciscan theology, most of 
all the work of John Duns Scotus (c1265/55–1308) and William of Ockham (c1288/89–1348). 
Indeed, the notion of individual, natural rights was from the outset bound up with the absolute 
sovereign power of the central state that we find in different ways in the work of Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, Grotius, Kant and Hegel.                                                         
22 The full quote is as follows: “Hence so far from its being or its having been a misfortune for the state that the 
church is disunited, it is only as a result of that disunion that the state has been able to reach its appointed end as a 
self-consciously rational and ethical organisation. Moreover, this disunion is the best piece of good fortune which 
could have befallen either the church or thought so far as the freedom and rationality of either is concerned”, in 




Duns Scotus’ univocity of being and the priority of representation over participation 
 
What are conditions of possibility for individual natural rights? Such rights can be thought of 
either in more relational, reciprocal ways (as for St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas) or in 
more substantial, unilateral ways (as for Duns Scotus and Ockham).23 In the latter case, the 
primacy of unilateral substance over reciprocal relation goes back to Duns Scotus’ ontology, 
notably his thesis of the univocity of being. To say that being is univocal (not analogical, as 
Aristotle and Aquinas argued) is to claim that a single concept of being encompasses all beings, 
including the foundation and finality of being. In other words, his account abstracts from any 
individuating characteristics or mutual relations because all things are thought of as ‘bare beings’ 
rather than things in relations to other things and their shared source in being itself. In this 
manner, univocally existing beings are stripped of all metaphysical positioning to other beings 
and their shared source in common being.24 Each individual represents nothing but its own self 
(not constitutive relations with others) and in turn can be represented by other selves. 
 
Scotist univocity implies that all things are individual substances rather than things in relations to 
other things and their shared source in being itself (e.g. Thomas Aquinas’s Neo-Platonist ens 
commune). By contrast with Scotus’ neo-Aristotelian focus on substance, there is a Neoplatonist 
emphasis on relation in the work of Augustine and Aquinas who defend the concept of the 
analogy of being. Accordingly, creating being and created being are analogically related but 
really distinct – the Creator is being itself whereas creation has being by originating from its 
creative source in God. Connected with analogia entis are notions such as the ens commune and 
bonum commune in which each individual thing can participate and through which it perfects 
relations with other individual things. Things are fundamentally relational (and not merely 
individual substances) by participating in the common good and common being of God. In turn, 
this account is part of a metaphysics and politics of participation whereby each individual has a 
‘share’ in the distribution of goods (both ideational and material) and takes part in the wider 
governance of the polity. 
 
In this light one can see the fundamental difference with the theology of Scotus. He operates a 
double rupture vis-à-vis the Neo-Platonist tradition of Augustine and Aquinas: first, he replaces 
the Augustinian-Thomist metaphysics of participation with an ontology of representation; 
second, he replaces a politics of transcendently ordered objectivity governed by the good with a                                                         
23 For a longer exposition, see Pabst, Metaphysics, pp. 54-268. 
24 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio (Opus oxoniense), II d. 1 q. 5 textus interpolatus and Ord. II d. 1 q. 5, nn. 189, 276, 
in C. Balic (ed.), Ioannis Duns Scoti O.F.M. Lectura (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950). 
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politics of transcendentally secured immanent subjectivity governed by rights. (Both 
representation and subjectivity are further developed by Ockham, as the following section 
shows).25 Accordingly, Scotus eschews relation in favour of substance, which is always already 
individual and entertains non-ontological, formal ties with other individual substances. By 
extension, humanity is an essence that characterises all human beings but in the aftermath of the 
Fall it does not translate into ontologically thick ties of ‘organic’ relations or ethical bonds of 
mutual rights and responsibilities. Once again by extension, nations and peoples are 
fundamentally divided and bound together by contracts based on formal principles.  
Ockham’s inauguration of secular absolutism 
 
Scotus’ ontology of univocity and his politics of representation are linked to Ockham’s 
nominalism and voluntarism. Building on Scotus’ destruction of analogy and participation, 
Ockham makes the twin claim that will is the ultimate principle of reality (voluntarism) – not 
intellect or logos (intellectualism) – and that universals are merely mental concepts or names 
(nominalism) – not actually embodied in real things (realism). In other words, for Ockham God 
rules over the universe by the sheer force of inscrutable divine volition, which sanctions the 
absolute power of kings. As a result of the Fall and the ontological rupture of creation from the 
Creator, mankind no longer participates in the supernatural Good of God that can produce a 
peaceful ordering of individual and social relations. In this manner, the violence of anarchy 
characterises both the created order as a whole and all its constituent elements – a vision that 
foreshadows Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’. 
 
Ockham’s account rests on his claim that God’s absolute, unmediated power (potentia Dei 
absoluta) keeps all beings in separate existence, without any unifying bond of being.26 Based on 
this ontological priority of the individual, he denies the reality of universals in things and limits 
universality to concepts in the mind alone. Universals are mental names (nomina mentalia) of 
concepts and not real ‘things’ in actually existing beings. Individuality is an essential property 
that belongs to a thing immediately and intrinsically – not in virtue of any relation with anything 
else.27 The whole of reality is radically singular and as such cannot communicate anything at all: 
“[…] there is nothing in [any two individuals] that is one and the same: whatever is in one                                                         
25 On Scotus’ ‘double destruction’ of analogy and the real distinction, see Olivier Boulnois, ‘Analogie et univocité 
selon Duns Scot : la double destruction’, Les Etudes Philosophiques, Vol. 3 (juillet-décembre 1989): 347-69. 
26 William of Ockham, Quodlibeta, VI, q. vi, in Guillelmi de Ockham. Opera Theologica, ed. Gedeon Gál et alii, 
(St. Bonavenure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1967-84), Vol. IX. Cf. William Courtenay, Capacity and Volition: A 
History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power (Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina, 1990), pp. 119-26. 
27 Ockham, Ordinatio, I, d. 2 q. 6, in Opera Theologica, Vol. VII, p. 350. 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simply and absolutely of itself is not something that exists in another”.28 Both the creator and his 
creation have being, but for Ockham this warrants neither Augustine’s definition of God as the 
highest being in which all other beings share nor Aquinas’s divine act of being that brings all 
things into existence and makes them what they are. Instead, Ockham’s nominalist ontology 
posits a strict duality between the sovereign omnipotent God and all that has existence in virtue 
of His absolute volition. 
 
The reason for this ‘ontological individualism’ is theological. Ockham contends that after the 
Fall, there is no metaphysical link between God and the world. Besides the individuality of each 
and everything, there is only the overriding absolute power of God’s arbitrary will. In the post-
lapsarian world, God grants humans two powers: to designate those who rule and to appropriate 
only individual (rather than also communal) property.29 In this way, he lays the theological and 
philosophical foundations for the primacy of the individual over the universal in which all can 
participate. Any form of commonality is now based on individual power and not on a shared 
divine gift of being. 
 
Ockham’s political thought largely reflects his theological ontology. Taken together, the primacy 
of the individual over the universal and the radical separation of immanence from transcendence 
laid the foundation for state supremacy vis-à-vis the Church and all other institutions within the 
temporal-spatial realm of the saeculum – i.e. in creedal Christianity the time between the Fall 
and the eschaton. Moreover, Ockham equated the temporal sphere with coercive jurisdiction 
which is a monopoly of the state. In consequence, ecclesiastical sentences based on papal and 
clerical authority have no legal force without the sanction of the secular authorities. 
 
So in the name of individual freedom and monarchical sovereign power, ecclesiastical power 
was subordinated to the state and the authority of the papacy is curtailed.30 (On Ockham’s 
advice, King Louis of Bavaria used this argument to limit the imperial jurisdiction of the papacy 
in his dispute with Pope John XXII.)31 As a result, state sovereignty is no longer framed by the 
                                                        
28 ‘[…] nihil est unum et idem in utroque, sed quidquid est in uno simpliciter et absolute de se non est aliquid quod 
est in alio’, in Ockham, Ordinatio, I d. 2 q. 6, in Opera Theologica, Vol. VII, p. 350. 
29 William of Ockham, Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico [On Tyrannical Rule], III, 13, in Wilhelm von Ockham 
als politischer Denker und sein Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico, ed. R. Scholz (Leipzig: SRADG, 1952), p. 
113. 
30 Alain Boureau, La Religion de l’État. La construction de la République étatique dans le discours théologique de 
l’Occident médiéval, 1250-1350 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2006), pp. 111-77; cf. Brian Tierney, The Crisis of 
Church & State, 1050-1300 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964). 
31 A.S. McGrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 
78-172, 197-206. 
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church, and religious limits on secular power are progressively loosened. As Janet Coleman 
argues, the consequence is that  
secular politics not only has its own process of self-correction, but that it is 
independent of ecclesial power […]. Because the temporal sphere is imperfect, he 
[Ockham] argued that secular sovereignty, once established, could be legitimate even 
when ‘absolute’, in that there need not be regular participation of the people in 
government, nor need there be institutions to restrain the power of kings.32 
 
These ideas tend to remove religious limits on secular politics and to legitimate the de facto 
absolute power of monarchs. Since the temporal realm is monopolised by the state at the expense 
of the church and other intermediary institutions that mediate the vision of a substantive common 
good as partaking of the highest good in God, Ockham’s account of popular sovereignty cannot 
prevent monarchical absolutism. 
 
In the wake of Scotus and Ockham, the saeculum was not only redefined as an autonomous 
space separate from both God and the Church but was also subsumed under the dominance of the 
imperium. Thus, the ontology of univocal being and the theology of divine volition gave rise to 
one of the first and most influential conceptions of absolute state sovereignty – a model that is 
compatible with monarchical or republican rule. 
 
3. Individual natural rights and the absolute coercive power of the state 
 
Paradoxically, the affirmation of individual natural rights by Franciscan theologians such as 
Ockham reinforces rather than mitigates the absolute power of the central sovereign. Even 
seemingly inalienable individual rights like the right to ownership or the power to delegate 
sovereignty to the ruler are ultimately alienable because property may be sold and delegation is 
irreversible. For inalienable individual rights are always already defined in terms of subjective 
right (ius), independently of the right use (usus) and the objective purpose (finis). The absence of 
ends or finalities is linked to the univocity of being that eliminates both analogy and 
participation in the supernatural Good of God. By contrast, Augustine and Aquinas link 
individual rights to mutual obligations and thereby put the emphasis on reciprocal relationality 
rather than unilateral substance. This more mutualist account of rights is connected with the idea 
of a substantive, just order that is upheld and perfected by good government and by the exercise 
of justice. In line with the participatory metaphysics of Neo-Platonism, people can continuously 
participate in the realisation of justice through different forms of assent. 
                                                        
32 Janet Coleman, ‘Ockham’s right reason and the genesis of the political as 'absolutist'’, History of Political 
Thought, XX (1999), pp. 35-64, quote at pp. 48 and 50. 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Ockham and the shift to subjective ius 
 
Ockham’s work in the area of legal theory marks the decisive shift from objective ius to 
subjective ius, as Michel Villey and his followers have documented against Leo Strauss and his 
disciples who claimed that this happened only with Hobbes.33 For Aquinas, natural right is 
invested personally in each human being but denotes not so much a subjective entitlement as an 
objectively ‘fair pattern of relationships’ as Brian Tierney puts it.34 In this sense, ius is owned in 
that each person has a proper ‘share’ in the distribution of things – both ideational and material. 
Therefore, ius is linked to the notion of an objective, ideal order which can be participated in, 
just as for Plato a good man who shares in the transcendent Good can also be considered to be 
good ‘in his own right’. In short, for Aquinas (as for Augustine before him), ius is both 
subjective and objective precisely because it denotes the individual belonging to a wider cosmic 
order that is ontologically more relational and juridically more reciprocal than the individual 
substance and unilateral rights for Scotus and Ockham. 
 
Indeed, for much of Franciscan theology starting with St. Bonaventure, individual rights are 
subjectively grounded in the sense that their meaning derives “not from social recognition in 
accordance with natural equity, but rather from a natural pre-moral fact, such as the fact of 
selfownership, or the contingent de facto circumstance of  property ownership upon which 
legitimacy is then positively conferred”.35 Instead of being objective reciprocal rights linked to 
mutual obligation, individual rights become purely subjective when they are no longer relational 
but are thought to be grounded in the sole capacity of the isolated individual. However, isolated 
individuals end up clashing with one another on account of rival interests and conflictual claims 
to subjective rights. Such clashes require the intervention by the absolute power of a 
voluntaristic God or an omnipotent sovereign – or both at once. The latter applied to the 
distinctly late medieval and early modern idea of monarchical absolutism by divine right, which 
transferred God’s absolute power to that of the sovereign, as John Neville Figgis first 
documented.36 Here one can see the Franciscan emphasis on voluntarism and individualism that                                                         
33 Michel Villey, La formation de la pensée juridique moderne (Paris: PUF, 2006); idem., Le droit et les droits de 
l’homme (Paris: PUF, 1983); For an overview of the debate, see Francis Oakley, Natural Law, Laws of Nature, 
Natural Rights: Continuity and Discontinuity in the History of Ideas (New York: Continuum, 2005), pp. 87-109. 
34 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law, 1150-1625 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm.B. Eerdmans, 1997), pp. 170-94. 
35 John Milbank, ‘Against Human Rights’, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (January 2012), pp. 1-32, quote at p. 
19. This section is indebted to Milbank’s arguments. 
36 The notion of the divine right of kings was an early modern innovation that departed from the patristic and 
medieval opposition to the sacralisation of secular power. See John Neville Figgis, The Theory of the Divine Right 
of Kings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1896). 
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rests on Scotus’ univocity of being, which allow a perfect rational grasp of immanent finite 
realities wholly separate from their transcendent infinite origin and end in the creative being of 
God. 
 
Moreover, Franciscan legal theory implies that only the individual right to property is inalienable 
to the ruler, not the people’s power of election. The reasoning is that it is the ruler’s duty to 
protect subjective property and contractual rights. However, this raises the crucial question about 
whether and to what extent free subjects may alienate to the central sovereign their original, 
natural right to self-protection. The modern social contract theory – of which Franciscan 
theology was one of the main antecedents – makes the point that individuals trade their alienable 
right to self-protection for their inalienable right to ownership. But the dialectic between natural 
right and social alienability ends up in upward spiral of central state power, as the ruler accrues 
sole prerogatives and, as the ultimate guarantor of security and property, can also suspend 
individual rights in the name of upholding the very order that purports to secure them. For in a 
state of nature in which individuals are pitted against each other (in the wake of the Fall), private 
freedom and property require an alien enforcer. By contrast, Augustine and Aquinas argued for 
objective right as part of a just order whose collective ends are ultimately underwritten by 
metaphysical realism (universals are present in things) and intellectualism (the mind can cognise 
universals so instantiated in things). 
 
Franciscan legal theory also reinforces the absolutist tendency of his theologically founded 
political theory. The power of the absolutist monarch is itself irrevocable for just the same reason 
that individual right is inalienable. That is because for the sake of public order and security, all 
has been taken into the ruler’s dominium (both political and economic), and the constitutional-
legal order now derives from his own self-propriety – not from the sovereignty of the persons, 
households and city-states that together constitute the political realm. Notions of legitimate rule 
and public morality are henceforth defined in nominalist and voluntarist terms that sidestep any 
questions of substantive unity or normative purpose beyond defending the power of the 
sovereign from both internal and external threats. 
 
On the contrary, for Augustine and Aquinas, legitimacy and moral standing are inextricably 
intertwined with the nature of the wider order that the ruler is meant to uphold – the pursuit of 
the common good through the exercise of justice and other virtues. The provisionality of politics 
(after the Fall) means that the state is autonomous and has its own integrity but that its coercive 
powers need to be counter-balanced by the persuasive powers of the Church. In turn, this 
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involves a different conception of the complex ties between the visible, institutional church and 
the invisible, mystical Church – away from centralism and the autocratic tendencies of the post-
Gregorian papacy towards greater collegiality and the participation of the faithful in the wider 
governance of the church and the political realm – as suggested by Aquinas and in particular by 
Nicholas of Cusa who argued in favour of a balance between hierarchy and authority of the 
clergy, on the one hand, and consent, representation and participation of the laity.37 
 
Westphalia and the consecration of contractual relations between sovereign states 
 
To summarise the argument thus far: the shift from realist-intellectualist metaphysics to 
nominalist-voluntarist ontology is at the origin of both secularist rationality and the secularism 
that pervades IR theory. Jürgen Habermas recognises as much but judges this evolution in a 
largely positive light: 
the move from Duns Scotus to [Ockham’s] nominalism does not merely lead to the 
Protestant voluntarist deity [Willensgott] but also paves the way for modern natural 
science. Kant’s transcendental turn leads not only to a critique of the proofs of God’s 
existence but also to the concept of autonomy which first made possible our modern 
European understanding of law and democracy. Moreover, historicism does not 
necessarily lead to a relativistic self-denial of reason. As a child of the Enlightenment, 
it makes us sensitive to cultural differences and prevents us from over-generalizing 
context-dependent judgments.38 
 
Contra Habermas, this essay argues that the Franciscan emphasis on nominalism and 
voluntarism paves the way for the secular settlement of the system of states. What links Ockham 
to Hobbes, Locke and later thinkers in the tradition of social contract theory is indeed the 
Franciscan theological legacy of a voluntaristic conception of the Creator.39 Accordingly, God’s 
absolute power is mirrored in the absolute power of the sovereign, including the protection of 
natural rights that are seen predominantly as individual and inalienable. In this manner, rights are 
henceforth subjective, unilateral and disconnected from any sense of a wider cultural and cosmic 
order wherein they are linked to use and purpose – as for Augustine and the Dominican tradition 
since Aquinas. Whereas the latter accentuate the objective nature of personal rights and their 
reciprocal relation obligations, the Franciscan conception of rights emphasises individual rights 
that are upheld by the absolute power of the state.                                                         
37 See Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 1150-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982); Francis Oakley, The Conciliarist Tradition: Constitutionalism in the Catholic Church, 
1300-1870 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
38 Jürgen Habermas, ‘An Awareness of What is Missing’, in J. Habermas et al., An Awareness of What is Missing: 
Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age, tr. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), pp. 15-23, quote at pp. 22-23. 
39 Francis Oakley, ‘The Absolute and Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Theology’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 59, No. 3 (1998), pp. 437-461; and idem., ‘The Absolute and Ordained Power 
of God in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Philosophy, Science, Politics and Law’, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, Vol. 59, No. 4 (1998), pp. 669-690. 
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The same theological shift from high medieval realism and intellectualism to late medieval 
nominalism and voluntarism led to the ‘modern’ Middle Ages that we commonly describe as 
modernity. To recapitulate briefly, this shift is associated with the passage from the Neo-
Platonism of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to the neo-Aristotelianism of John Duns Scotus 
and William of Ockham, as the previous sections outlined. For Augustine and Aquinas, the 
world describes an order of being that is governed by transcendent universals (or divine ideas), 
which are present in immanent particular things (realism) and as such knowable to the human 
mind (intellectualism). For Ockham, by contrast, universals are just mental concepts/names 
(nominalism) with which the human intellect cognises the structure of the world that reveals the 
power of God’s will (voluntarism) rather than patterns or traces of the divine Logos. 
 
Politically, the nominalist-voluntarist ontology of Ockham – by separating the natural order of 
immanence from the supernatural order of transcendence – introduces a series of antagonistic 
binary opposites such as natural reason versus supernatural faith or unalterable, created nature 
versus the artificial, human construct of society. Instead of discovering and perfecting a pre-
given political order that is open to the transcendent supernatural Good in God, human 
rationality is henceforth concerned with constructing a new politics – as in Machiavelli or 
Hobbes. Paradoxically, their political ‘realism’ is rooted in the nominalist mode of Franciscan 
theology that rests on what Michael Oakeshott poignantly termed “will and artifice”.40 By 
encompassing both the ethical and the religious, such a new account of ‘the political’ inaugurates 
the modern phase of the Middle Ages, notably the secular settlement of sovereign states, 
contractual relations and individual rights that is at the heart of mainstream IR theories. 
 
4. Franciscan Theology and the invention of modern markets 
 
Like the modern state system, the modern market system rests on a number of concepts and 
theories that are rooted in the nominalist and voluntarist mode of Franciscan theology. These 
concepts include the separation of contract from gift and risk from reward, the lifting of ethical 
restrictions on usurious practices as well as the growing autonomy of commerce vis-à-vis social 
and civic life. As with individual, subjective rights and the purpose or finality of ‘just order’, 
Franciscan theologians stress unilateral contract and the primacy of utility over the good. This 
contrasts with the more reciprocalist arrangements advocated by the Dominicans who sought to 
link economic value more closely to social reciprocity and individual profit to the shared                                                         
40 Michael Oakeshott, ‘Introduction’, in Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a 
Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (1651), ed. M. Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960). 
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common good. Coupled with other conceptual innovations, Franciscan ideas on contract and 
capital provided some of the intellectual building blocks for transnational markets, which 
gradually became disembedded from social ties and civic bonds. After Westphalia, transnational 
markets increasingly converged with national states to form a new system of power that 
progressively subsumed the institutions of empire, church and city-states. 
 
Franciscan ‘economic theology’ and the intellectual origins of capitalism 
 
Just as the modern system of sovereign states was not invented at Westphalia but first imagined 
in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, so too the modern system of capitalist markets 
was not founded by Calvinism but in fact first formulated by late medieval Franciscan 
theologians. The role of the Franciscan tradition in the history of economic thought is well-
established, and a number of studies have corrected the Weberian narrative on the origins of 
capitalism, which has been influential in IR.41 However, deep disagreements persist over 
whether Franciscan accounts promoted moral markets by linking social value to economic profit 
or whether they favoured the rise of the capitalist logic by subjecting both production and money 
to exchange rather than use value. In large part, these differences in interpretation extend to the 
Dominican tradition which is variously seen as genuinely more developed or as wrongly 
overshadowing the work of Franciscan figures. 
 
Already in the second half of the thirteenth century, the Franciscan Pietro du Giovanni Olivi 
(1248 – 1298) redefines usury in more narrow terms such that merchants can engage in wider 
forms of money-lending without falling foul of the laws banning usurious practices. In his 
Treatise on Commerce, Money-lending and Repayment, he argues that it is licit to distinguish 
between loans linked to production and money lent for other purposes. While the latter could be 
seen as forms of usury, the former should be viewed as a compensation for losses incurred by the 
merchant. As Bazzichi suggests his commentary of Olivi, “Those damages, with their two 
components of forestalled profits and resulting harm, were expressed with the word ‘interest’, 
derived from the Roman law term of the same meaning”.42 However, the point that Bazzichi 
underplays is that Olivi treats money not merely as a medium of exchange aimed at facilitating 
production and therefore shared benefits but as something that has value in its own right which 
lends itself to profit-making. In the words of Olivi “that which in the firm intention of its owner                                                         
41 See, inter alia, Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, reprint (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986; Oreste Bazzichi, Alle radici del capitalismo. Medioevo e scienza economica (Turin: Effatà Editrice, 
Cantalupa, 2003); Ernesto Screpanti and Stefano Zamagni, An Outline of the History of Economic Thought, 2nd ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
42 Bazzichi, Alle radici del capitalismo, p. 
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is ordained to some probable gain does not only possess the character of money or a thing 
straightforward, but beyond this a certain seminal reason of profitability which we usually call 
"capital".”43 Unlike Aquinas and the Dominican tradition that limits money-lending for 
productive purposes and regards other forms as usury, Olivi opens up a space for speculative 
capital. John Milbank rightly concludes that “one theoretical building-block of ‘capitalism’ is 
indeed in place here”.44 
 
Olivi’s argument in favour of speculative capital was taken further by Scotus whose 
(theologically cogent) insistence on ‘human usefulness’ as a criterion for economic value did not 
stop him from arguing for the remuneration of merchants. While one might see this as a proper 
form of reciprocity, it is nevertheless the case that Scotus emphasises the individual entitlement 
of the merchant to profit and that the judgement of what constitutes a useful service to the 
community is not subject to communal discernment. Alessandro Bonini (also known as 
Alexander of Alexandria to differentiate him from Alexander of Hales) – who was Scotus’ 
successor as bishop of Paris and minister general of the Franciscan order – extended the logic of 
financial capital that had been invented by his fellow Franciscans. In his treatise On Usury 
(1302), he effectively ignored the canonical condemnation of usurious practices by arguing that 
profit from monetary transactions because money lending “is necessary for those who travel in 
different places for commerce, without which there is no social life”. In other words, commerce 
is as important, if not more so, than the social bonds that according to Dominicans like Aquinas 
should embed economic exchange. In this manner a whole range of financial and credit 
operations were henceforth seen as legitimate. 
 
Another Franciscan theologian, Gerald Odonis, argued in the fourteenth century that lenders 
retains ownership of the loans that they disburse and that the interest charged is therefore a kind 
of rent – not usury. This claim follows the same secular logic as Olivi, Scotus and Bonini in 
shifting the emphasis away from reciprocity and mutual benefit (as part of a more participatory 
metaphysics) to individual regard for profit and a more unilateral, subjective control (as part of 
the univocal ontology). Linked to this is the focus on representing immanent exchange value 
rather than embodying a share of the transcendent good that is distributively present in all things 
(as for Aquinas). Indeed, in the Dominican tradition questions of money-lending and ownership 
                                                        
43 Peter Olivi, De Usuris, Dubium 6. 
44 John Milbank, ‘A Real Third Way: For a New Meta-Narrative of Capitalism and the Associationist Alternative’, 
in A. Pabst (ed.), The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Pope Benedict XVI’s social encyclical and the future of political 
economy (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2011), pp. 27-70, quote at p.  
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are seen in more reciprocalist and mutualist terms. Lending at a certain interest rate is not merely 
a matter of individual utility or (risk of) loss but rather involves both a measure of co-investment 
and a gradual transfer of ownership. For this reason, risk and reward are closely connected, and 
the benefits of an investment (based on a loan) should be shared between the borrower and the 
lender. 
 
Bound up with this distributist vision is the accentuation of just price, proper use and true human 
ends. Objective human flourishing, not subjective rights or individual utility is the right finality 
of economic activity. Far from being a mere instrument in generating wealth, for Aquinas and 
his fellow Dominicans the market could and should reflect social norms that promote human 
flourishing, from food and shelter via education to honour and esteem. As Milbank argues,  
Hence to appeal back to these subtle considerations on price and money is not to 
appeal to an ideal previous social order free of the taint of usury, which in fact 
never existed. It is rather to appeal to a critique of a capitalistic market society 
already faintly emergent. Likewise, to appeal to guild organization or a medieval 
corporatist blending of the social, economic and the political is not to appeal to a 
bygone feudal order – which incidentally, historians tell us never existed in the 
contractualist terms later fantasized, since it was rather a kind of hierarchized gift 
exchange part-created by the Church in order to reign back knightly violence 
through a cult of knightly honour. It is rather, in parallel to the invocation of 
Aquinas, to appeal to past creative ecclesial efforts to resist and qualify ‘free 
market’ tendencies which were already emergent.45 
 
Univocal ontology, Baroque scholastic theology and the logic of capitalism 
 
Franciscan theology laid the conceptual foundations for an increasingly capitalist market in the 
sense of being disembedded from both social bonds and ethical constraints. Recent studies have 
documented the extend to which the work of Olivi, Scotus, Bonini and Odone shaped other 
Franciscan figures such as St. Bernadino of Siena and influential theologians such as Nicola 
Oresme.46 The ‘economic theology’ which they invented was further elaborated by Baroque 
scholastics such as Francisco Suárez and ultimately paved the way for the ‘marginalist 
revolution’ in the 1870s that gave rise to the neo-classical economics of both the Austrian and 
later the Chicago school of economics.47 Common to this tradition of economic thought is the 
idea that utility maximisation is the overriding goal and that it takes the form of commodities                                                         
45 Milbank, ‘The Real Third Way’, p. 58. 
46 Giacomo Todeschini, I mercanti e il tempio (Bologna: Edizioni il Mulino, 2002); Giovanni Ceccarelli, Il gioco e il 
peccato (Bologna: Edizionu il Mulino, 2003). 
47 Alejandro A. Chafuen, Faith and Liberty. The Economic Thought of the Late Scholastics (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2003), pp. 13-29; Adrian Pabst, ‘On the Theological Origins of the Secular Market State’, in Roberto 
Scazzieri and Raffaella Simili (eds.), The Migration of Ideas (Sagamore Beach, MA: Watson International 
Publishing, 2008), pp. 99-122. 
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consumables by the individual in isolation – independently of just price, proper use and the true 
human end of flourishing through the participation in the supernatural Good of God. 
 
Two key conceptual innovations laid down the intellectual foundations of modern markets and 
the earliest observable germs of capitalism. First of all, Scotus’ theology erased the ontological 
difference between Creator and creation and replaced the metaphysics of analogy and 
participation with an ontology of univocity and representation. Ockham extended this by 
substituting the will for the intellect and mental names for real universals in things. Instead of 
viewing everything as potentially participating in the supernatural Good of God (as for 
Augustine and the Dominicans such as Aquinas), the Franciscan tradition since Scotus and 
Ockham invented a new immanent plateau of being – a universal mathēsis of abstract and 
spatialized relations wherein individual substances are bound together not by a metaphysical 
relationality but by formal and procedural links. As Joel Kaye has shown, the new account of 
nature in the late thirteenth and the fourteenth century was shaped decisively by a growing 
monetisation of European society.48 There was a confluence and mutually reinforcing 
convergence between ideational and material changes, as both ontology and economics are 
increasingly separated from theology and come under the purview of a new science of natural 
philosophy and physics. Based upon measurement, gradation and the quantification of qualities, 
this new science shifted the emphasis from questions of proper use, shared ends and a just order 
towards issues of individual utility, subjective control and unilateral arrangements. 
 
The second conceptual innovation that helped gave rise to the modern capitalist market was the 
sundering of nature from the supernatural, which Ockham’s late medieval nominalism 
inaugurated and the Baroque scholasticism of the Counter-Reformation brought to full fruition. 
According to Suàrez, the autonomy of “pure nature” implies that man’s natural end is divorced 
from his supernatural finality. This conception relegates divine grace to an extrinsic principle 
that is superadded to the natural realm, rather than a supernaturally infused gift that deifies 
nature from within (as it was for the Church Fathers and Doctors in both the ‘Greek East’ and the 
‘Latin West’). As a result, human activity in the polity, the economy and society is separated 
from divine deification, which implies that both state and market are seen as increasingly 
autonomous and amoral. 
 
That the market is thus viewed as morally neutral helps to explain why modern Catholicism is 
largely compatible with the secular liberalism and capitalism that Max Weber imputes almost                                                         
48 Joel Kaye, Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the Emergence of 
Scientific Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
  20 
exclusively to the Protestant Reformation. For a morally neutral market is compatible with the 
sole promotion of individual freedom at the expense of fraternal solidarity and the “preferential 
option for the poor.” The latter is a key element of Catholic social teaching that is ignored by the 
neo-Baroque position of contemporary Catholic commentators, in particular the neo-
conservatism of George Weigel and the ‘Whig Thomism’ of Michael Novak.49  
 
Crucially, the entire tradition of modern economics – from its origins in late medieval Franciscan 
theology via Baroque scholasticism and the Scottish enlightenment to the Austrian and the 
Chicago School – views markets as disembedded from the communal and associationist ties of 
intermediary institutions. It thereby severs both production and exchange from the civic virtues 
that are embodied in various forms of human association and from the moral sentiments that 
govern interpersonal relations. The Westphalian system of sovereign national states and 
transnational ‘free’ markets is rooted in this nominalist and voluntarist mode.  
 
By contrast, Dominican theology – from the work of Aquinas via Nicholas of Cusa to sixteenth-
century Thomism – shaped an alternative tradition that includes the Cambridge Platonists, the 
Neapolitan Enlightenment and nineteenth-century Russian political economy. This tradition 
focuses on more reciprocalist and mutualist arrangements that reflect the shared pursuit of the 
common good in which all can participate. Notions of international society or a family of nations 
dimly reflect this realist and intellectualist mode. Thus, both the dominant modern model of IR 
and the hitherto more marginal alternative vision rest on late medieval theological traditions. In 
this sense we can speak of the ‘modern’ Middle Ages rather than a whole new phase of history. 
 
Conclusion: the neo-medieval shape of international affairs 
 
The tradition of Franciscan theology is central to the late medieval ‘imagination’ that has shaped 
much of modern thought, including IR theory. Individual subjective rights and the absolute 
power of the central sovereign have privileged purely contractual relations within and between 
states. The system of national states and transnational markets has enshrined the priority of 
abstract principles and procedural processes over substantive ties and a commitment to shared 
ends. Crucially, the Franciscan legacy is wedded to an international system that repeatedly re-
produces the very conditions of anarchy and violence which it purports to overcome. 
 
However, among the many shortcomings of the modern system of states and markets is the idea                                                         
49 On this misreading of the Catholic Christian tradition, see Adrian Pabst, ‘Introduction: the future of political 
economy’, in The Crisis of Global Capitalism, pp. 1-18. 
  21 
of a purely formal alliance of nations that share only formal principles in common – whether the 
cessation of hostilities after the Thirty Year War, or the balance of power following the Vienna 
Congress, or again human rights and democracy in the post-1945 era. Neither international 
treaties like that of Westphalia nor international organisations such as the League of Nations and 
the UN have created lasting peace because in different ways they suffer a double deficit that is 
doubly linked. First, the merely formal principles prevent parties to a treaty or members of 
organisations from debating and developing any substantive account of a shared polity that is 
constituted by social bonds and cultural ties, not just rights and contracts. Second, the merely 
formal alliance of states ensures that treaties and organisations lack any real power of enforcing 
agreement, unity or even peace. The mutual linkage between formal principles and formal 
powers arise because principles of themselves engender no concrete unity, while mere contract – 
which is divorced from the power of enforcement – fails to generate any substantive agreement. 
 
Partly for this reason, older and more mutualist notions of ‘international society’ or ‘family of 
nations’ are coming once again to the fore of both academic research and public debate.50 
Arguably we now live in a neo-medieval era insofar as we have outlived the hegemony of 
national states and transnational markets.51 International affairs really are neo-medieval in the 
sense that they combine the pre-modern legacy of overlapping jurisdictions and multiple 
membership with a contemporary focus on transnational networks as well as the institutions and 
actors of ‘global civil society’. Even if it is intellectually broken and morally bankrupt, it is 
nonetheless equally clear that the Westphalian settlement remains dominant. 
 
But the end of the bi-polar world order and the continuous crisis of the capitalism suggest that 
sovereign states and capitalist markets are inherently unstable because they bring about the very 
anarchy that was their own presupposition. Even if, as Christopher Dawson noted, there was a 
medieval rift between an ecclesial ‘society of peace’ and an imperial ‘society of war’, the former 
had a tendency to temper the latter precisely at the international level where the enduring ties of 
faith and culture could provide bonds of trust, cooperation and reconciliation. Thus the question 
is about which traditions can transform the present and shape the future. However unlikely it 
may appear to IR theory, the emphasis on more mutualist and reciprocalist arrangements in 
Dominican theology and cognate concepts in other traditions can provide the conceptual 
resources on which a new vision of international affairs ultimately depends.                                                         
50 Cf. Jens Bartelson, Visions of World Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
51 See, inter alia, Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty?: The Politics of a Shrinking and 
Fragmenting World (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992); Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos 
in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic Press, 2003). 
